Yves here. On a recent interview with Nima Alkhorshid, Michael Hudson explains how the Trump tariffs are yet another mechanism for the US to try to preserve and perhaps even extend its hegemony, and how Trump’s approach extends policies that go back to the end of World War II.
Originally published by Dialogue Works
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Hi, everybody. Today is Thursday, May 15, 2025, and our friend Michael Hudson is back with us. Welcome back, Michael.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Good to be here.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Michael, let’s talk about what’s going on between the United States and the United Kingdom. In your opinion, how is Britain being used by the United States today in a similar way to its role in 1944 during the creation of the IMF and World Bank?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, it’s pretty much exactly the same role.
In 1944, the United States was planning, how do we create a post-war order that benefits itself? And its number one aim was to dissolve the British Empire and the French Empire by making rules that benefited the United States.
For instance, the end of empire preference and basing the financial system on gold and especially countering John Maynard Keynes, who saw the problems that were going to develop over the next 50 years.
He said that the problem is going to be that the United States is going to be a creditor country. It’s going to get other countries in debt to itself. They’re going to like England, especially. And we want a kind of rules that if there’s one country that continues to run surpluses and in other countries that run deficits, we have to say, okay, America is not letting England earn the dollars to pay the debts that the United States has forced it into with the British loan in 1944.
And I’ve described all that in Super Imperialism and there were wonderful debates in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. And they basically, the tenor of their comments was, we don’t have any choice. We’re completely dependent on the United States. We just have to knuckle under.
And so Keynes’s rules were turned down and England agreed to rules that became the post-war economic order benefiting the United States in creating the IMF and the World Bank along lines that benefited itself at the expense of other countries.
Well, what the United States then did was go to continental Europe and say, well, look, we’ve done this with England. That’s the prototype. There was an inertia and England was always the first to sell out Europe and other countries to surrender to the United States. And the US would take its surrender and use that negotiation to set the rules that other countries were supposed to join.
Well, that’s just what happened in the last few days. The United States went to England and made it, it agreed, without mentioning China specifically, it agreed on trade rules that were national security rules, meaning anything that China exported to England that could be national security, like cloth that could be used for army uniforms, anything that would be banned.
And basically, Trump had already announced pretty much what he was going to do on Liberation Day on April 2nd. He said, we’re going to impose these tariffs on other countries. He didn’t say this is going to create chaos there, but we’re going to give him a choice.
What he said was, of course, we can roll the tariffs back down if they give givebacks. And the givebacks were what American policies were they going to accept. And the acceptance were pretty much exactly what England has just agreed to.
So it’s obvious that Trump did not really expect this whole tariff issue to be about tariffs. He made it very clear the tariff issue is about forcing other countries to join our Cold War against Russia and China, especially China, for all of that. And that is basically what these rules are about.
And the same thing you have Germany now joining England under Mr. Merz.
So the problem for other countries is, are they going to avoid this short-term crisis, this short-term disruption in their trade that Trump has caused by reorienting their trade away from Russia, away from China, and away from their allies in East Asia?
Or are they going to decide, well, the U.S. economy is shrinking, and it’s shrinking especially, we can discuss that, because of the actions that Trump has taken, he’s guaranteed we’re moving into a recession here.
If other countries surrender to him and agree to his terms to tie their trade and investment to a shrinking U.S. economy, then they’re going to have to sacrifice not trading with Russia, China, and the global majority that’s growing instead of shrinking.
Well, the whole problem for other countries is, what do we mean when we say another country? We usually mean what their leaders are going to say, and Starmer in England and Merz in Germany really do not represent what their voters want.
And we know that because of all of the protests by the voters against Starmer, the Labour Party is now at the lowest ebb that it’s ever pulled before. And same thing for the Christian Democrats in Germany, the Germans don’t want Merz and the anti-Russian re-militarization that he wants, but the United States has promoted people like Starmer and Merz to be the heads of their countries.
So you have a strange condition that the leaders of countries that America deals with first are representing U.S. interests or being willing to go along. They believe that their personal careers will continue to be linked to the United States, just as the U.S. was promoting them from the very beginning along U.S. ideological and political lines.
So that’s basically what’s happening. Other countries are being asked to sacrifice themselves to the U.S. economy.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Michael, you mentioned the national security of the United States. How do you see the strategic goal behind the United States invoking national security clauses in trade negotiations, particularly in relation to China?
MICHAEL HUDSON: National security means anything that you want it to. It’s a portmanteau word, as linguists say. It can mean anything can be national security.
You see the United States wanting to close down Harvard and other universities on the grounds of national security that its students protest against war and genocide. That’s a national security threat.
You see him arresting immigrants on the grounds that it’s national security. Anything can be national security.
So all the United States has to say is X, Y, or Z trade with Russia or China threatens our national security because China wants to export something that we want to export instead. Or China wants to import something from Europe like etching machinery for computer chips that it can use militarily.
And so essentially it means that the United States has completely arbitrary dictatorship in deciding what other countries can do. It means that we now are aiming at a centrally planned economy planned by the U.S. military and the deep state in preparation for escalating cold war against Russia and China. That’s what it means.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Michael, what choice do countries face between aligning with the United States and turning toward China, China’s more dynamic market, if we can put it that way?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, if they’re not allowed to trade with China, what can they do?
They’re not able to earn enough foreign trade returns to remain solvent. And the main victims in all of this are the global south countries in particular. They’re already having difficulty paying their foreign debts. They’re falling into arrears.
The bonds of Latin American and other global south countries are falling in price because they’re really risky. And so here’s basically the problem. And there’s a solution that they have.
The problem is that if they increase their taxes to somehow throw their currency on the foreign exchange market to try to raise the dollars to pay the bondholders that hold dollar-denominated debts, then they’re not going to have enough money for the governments to invest in domestic infrastructure or to promote just social programs. They will have to do to themselves what Trump and Musk and the Republicans are doing to the United States, cutting back social programs, cutting back research and development, squeezing out the economy by imposing austerity to pay the bondholders.
And in other words, countries and their leaders, or elected leaders, are going to have to put the interest of foreign countries over their own national interest.
Well, that’s a loss of sovereignty. You’d think that the definition of sovereignty is to permit sovereign countries to decide how to run their own tax and monetary system to promote their own economic development. But if they’re prevented from doing this now, then what to do?
Well, what Trump has done is given them a godsend in all of this. There was already talk about, are we going to be back in the situation we were in the 1980s, after Mexico defaulted on its Tesobonos, and you had the Latin American countries declaring insolvency. You then had the Brady plan come in and wrote down their debts to something that was payable, but it was a lost decade for Latin America.
And the International Monetary Fund, basically an arm of the U.S. military, used its loan capacity to support right-wing leaders supported by the United States and to withdraw support from countries with leaders who U.S. foreign policy did not find congenial to American foreign policy.
So the countries can now say, well, there was an implicit moral contract in international trade, and this was exactly what Keynes had spoken about in 1944. Keynes had been one of the, probably the leading economists during the German reparations debate, saying that if the allies insist in getting reparations debts to pay the United States, the United States has to permit Germany to earn the money by exporting to the United States.
But the United States Congress said, well, wait a minute, we don’t want the debtors to earn money to pay us by competing with U.S. industry. So they passed a law about trade with countries with depreciating currencies, meaning a floating tariff that would go up to erase any currency advantage that Germany or other allied debtors had trying to raise the money to export to pay their foreign debts.
Well, Keynes said, you have to wipe out the Versailles reparations debts and the inter-allied debts that were supposed to be paid out of German reparations to the United States for arms that the allies fought before America had entered World War I.
Well, the same moral argument that was discussed all during the 1920s has just reappeared today. Global South countries can say, Trump’s tariffs have prevented us from earning the money to earn the dollars to pay the bondholders that have U.S. dollars. We can’t pay them, so we’re going to need exactly what happened to the world in 1931 when there was a moratorium on German reparations and inter-allied debts or in the 1980s when you had the Brady plans come in.
They have an opportunity to suspend debt payments, and what that’s going to do is force the United States to make a choice. You’re going to have the bondholders do what they tried to do to Argentina in the last few decades. They’ll say, well, if you default on a foreign debt, we get to treat you like we treated Venezuela or Argentina or Iran. We get to grab whatever assets you have here. We can grab, if you have government investments in the United States, we can grab them. We can grab your gold. We can grab your military ships when they travel abroad as the Americans tried to grab an Argentinian ship when it visited a friendly African port.
So, other countries literally will face a force majeure of the U.S. trying to grab their assets in the same way that the United States and Europe grabbed Russia’s $300 billion of assets.
What can they do? All they can do is join together and say, well, if you grab, this is morally wrong, and you have not let us write the rules of international finance and international trade in a way that benefit us, not you. You, the United States, changed the rules in 1971 away from gold. You’re changing the rules today under President Trump unilaterally. But you’re 1% of the population, or 15% when you add all Europe and everyone in. We’re going to have to create a whole alternative economic order. And if you grab our assets, we get to grab all of your foreign investments in our countries.
And finally, we’ll just sort of leave existing assets in place, and every country gets to keep what assets are in their own country. The U.S. gets to grab foreign assets of debtor countries that it’s prevented from paying their debts. The global swath and global maturity will together take control of America’s mining investments abroad, oil investments abroad, any assets they have abroad. They will take US banks under their own national control and turn them into public utilities, much like China’s central bank. You’ll have the opportunity, tailor-made, to create their own monetary order. Well, all you need for this is an idea of what will this order look like. They have to actually have a plan. That’s the only thing that’s missing right now. They need a plan, and they need the reality that they can call America’s bluff. They can say, okay, you know, we’re not going to sign an agreement like the agreement that England signed and that Germany is going to sign as a surrender. We’re going to say, okay, we’re going to say, okay, leave your 80% tariffs on Bangladesh and other countries, leave your 40% tariffs on us. We can’t pay, we’re now maybe at the BRICS meeting that’s coming up next month, we’re going to lay out the plans for a new international economic order, such as we actually have wanted to do ever since the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1974 of non-aligned countries and its sequence conferences.
So you can have these non-aligned countries align with each other in mutual aid now that they have enough variety, enough of a full-spectrum range of production and money among themselves that they can afford to go it alone. They could never afford to go it alone before, but now they can. So all they have to do is realize their position of strength.
Well, everyone realizes this except economists who said, well, you have to conform to the market and the market is just what America has designed. The market isn’t natural. It’s designed in the United States for the United States to benefit the United States at your expense or, as Donald Trump says, to make us winners and you losers.
So the question is, how are we going to get the global majority to actually act on this wonderful opportunity and create this new international economic order that is independent and finally gets rid of the fact that debts cannot be paid without sacrificing their own growth so that you finally leave countries with their own natural resources free of American owners that do not pay taxes on these? And to use these natural resources, land rents, monopoly rents, monopoly rents from the public utilities and infrastructure that American companies have bought. They can now use all of these economic rents to finance their own capital investment and begin to develop along the same lines that America, Germany, other countries developed in the 19th century, for their industrial takeoff. That’s the potential.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Michael, with what you’ve said, considering all the information that you’ve given to us, do you believe that Trump’s plan is not actually to re-industrialize the United States, but rather to dismantle it?
MICHAEL HUDSON: That’s the effect of what he’s doing. The fact is, there’s no way that the United States can re-industrialize for a number of reasons. There are preconditions that you need to re-industrialize.
The most obvious thing you need in America to re-industrialize, you need labor. But there’s America doesn’t have the labor force to work in industry because nobody wants to work in industry, because the pay rates are so low for very hard factory work jobs, blue-collar labor, that it’s only 35 cents an hour more than being a waiter or a service industry person or a stacker in an Amazon warehouse.
So, white people don’t want to work in manual labor. In the past, this manual labor was done very largely by immigrants. But Trump doesn’t want immigrants, so you have the immigrant labor not available to do this.
In the past, there was a black labor who moved up from the south to become the industrial labor and the unionized labor.
But in order to work in industry, you actually need some kind of training. And that’s why, for many years, America had a highly developed vocational school system, just as Germany did during its industrial takeoff. Very, very good training of workmen and industrialists and factory jobs.
But that has not been the case in the United States. We’ve shifted away from science and engineering and mathematics and industrialization generally into more, I’m not sure how to characterize what they’re studying, but it’s not industrial.
So, you’ve had this class war in the United States against unionized labor, mainly industrial labor, by offshoring. And that offshoring of industry has indeed led to very little demand for industrial labor. So, hardly by surprise, there isn’t an industrial labor force anymore.
Well, the other thing you need, suppose you had this labor, you need raw materials like steel and aluminum, because almost any manufactured good is made out of steel and aluminum.
Well, what Trump has done is the reverse of what protective tariffs are supposed to do. The whole strategy of Britain, of the United States, was we want to import low priced raw materials from other countries, and we want them all to compete with each other, supplying us with crops and metals and mineral products. And then we will monopolize ourselves industrial production, and that’s where the value added is. So, our labor can exchange for much more labor of raw materials that produce these countries.
Well, what Trump has done is essentially going to the few unions that are left, like the steel workers. And he said, “You know, I want union votes.” He trotted out a steel worker who said, “This is a wonderful tariff.” You know, we’re certainly going to vote for Trump.
But the rest of industry, what Trump’s tariff means is that American manufacturers are going to have to pay much more of a world — there’s a common world price for all raw materials, but Americans are going to have to pay more than their European or Asian counterparts because of Trump’s tariff. So he’s already broken the most basic rule of tariff policy.
Well, another thing you’re going to need is you’re going to need machinery. And most of the machinery. And most of the machinery that is used in the United States right down to nuts and bolts and screws.
I used to know the CEO of a company that made screws and fasteners. And she finally closed down her company because she said, “No, we can’t afford to make them anymore. Other countries are making them. And imagine there are no more screws made in the United States. They’re all imported.”
Well, imagine if all of a sudden, with the trade barriers, America’s dependent on foreign countries for things that should be very easy to make, like screws, but which American industry says, “Well, there’s no monopoly profit from high technology and patent rates on all of this.”
Trump’s plan is to make American exports based on a particular kind of industry. Either it’s the computer industry, information technology, or it’s arms, monopolized exports that other countries do not produce and are blocked from producing for one reason or another.
And he hopes that somehow he can get these huge monopoly products, prices on selected US sectors and essentially get a free lunch from other countries, not producing them. Well, as your other commentators have pointed out in the fighting in Ukraine, and elsewhere, the American arms don’t seem to work very well. And other countries, even though Trump has just negotiated an enormous arms sale to Saudi Arabia, this does not mean that these arms are really going to work. I think this is a political idea. And basically, Saudi Arabia’s agreed to be a good customer for the US, so that the United States will protect its interests and put its Wahhabi terrorists in charge of Syria, so that Saudi Arabia can spread Islamic terrorism. and its particular brand of Islam and protect it against Iranian or more civilized forms of Islam.
So trade doesn’t depend on actual usefulness of process anymore. And just in the last few weeks, we’ve seen other reasons why America can’t can’t industrialize.
Trump has waged war on America’s leading universities. He’s said, we’re closing down all research funding for technology, for pharmaceuticals, for biology, for everything at universities that permit its students to say, we’re against war, and we’re against genocide. That is a threat to American security, because genocide is us. War is us. That’s a threat if they’re doing that.
So he’s essentially trying even to take away the tax exemption of Harvard as sort of the first big giant to knock down so he can take over essentially, it used to be called fascism, take over the curriculum that Harvard’s allowed to teach. It really can’t teach Islamic studies, Near Eastern studies. It’s a total control. And not only is the money for university research cuts back, but also Trump has deterred foreign students from attending universities.
Well, foreign students, especially from China and other Asian countries, India, were their profit centers because they were the students who paid full tuition of anywhere from 50,000 to 90,000 a semester for their studies. Well, now they’re not going to be coming anymore. You’re going to have a drastic reduction in their coming. They’re afraid to come because what if they were to say, we’re against the war? Well, out you go. Your student visa is canceled. You don’t get to show up for your final tests.
And not only that are the students blocked, but so are the graduates. The feeling is that many of the students who came to the United States from abroad and wanting to specialize in engineering and science and technology stayed in the United States. And so the United States had other countries pre-educate and all the costs of raising children growing up through college age. And then it got the benefit of their coming here.
That’s what’s made America so rich ever since the early 19th century, the immigration of skilled labor.
And Trump is now his war on the universities and war on anyone advocating peace is losing this whole benefit that the United States has had.
So Trump is actually his so-called tariff policy and the givebacks that he’s announced saying that these tariffs are to help us re-industrialize. That’s just a cover story. They’re not going to help America industrialize.
What Trump really wanted to do was he imagined that somehow other countries were going to surrender to the United States. They would continue to export just what they’re exporting now, but they would drastically reduce the price of what they charge for their exports.
Trump said Americans won’t pay the cost of tariffs. Foreign countries will pay the cost of tariffs. Well, that was just silly. Of course, Americans have to pay the price of tariffs.
Other countries are not going to sacrifice because there’s no profit for them. Profits are often 10 to 15%. If tariffs are higher than that, you cannot produce export goods at a profit. They’ll have to find another market.
Well, where are they going to find another market if they have to sign a contract with the U.S. saying we’re not going to trade with Russia or China for all of this? You can see the noose that Trump is tightening around the U.S. economy and the whole Cold War neocon plan for everything.
There’s very little that they can do.
Well, what are other countries going to do for all this? They’re not going to export and that means that there’s not going to be anywhere near the vast amount of tariff revenue that Trump promised would be.
Same thing with Elon Musk’s cutbacks of government spending at Doge. Many of these are marginal and fictitious. He’s really gone after cultural spending on Medicare payments. Payments for the low income classes are basically scratched.
But there’s not going to be anywhere enough income to make up for the tax cuts that the Republicans are now putting this week before Congress renewing all of the tax cuts that Trump put before and then some.
So the result is everybody who’s done a budget analysis sees the American budget is going to go up and up and up. And today, the 10-year Treasury bond, the yield is over 4.5%. When the bond prices yield go up, the prices go down. People are saying, wait a minute, do we really want a 10-year, not to mention a 30-year Treasury bond, if there’s such a large budget deficit and so little production taking place, this is going to be inflationary. Do we really want to invest our savings? And this includes foreign central bank savings and foreign government savings. Do we want to invest in the debt of a country whose prices are going to go up and we won’t call it hyperinflation, but the price increase will go up, the exchange rate of the dollars we have will go down.
And Trump has said, we want the exchange rates to go down. 10%, 20%. Well, I think it was 10% in the Plaza Accords with Japan, way back, back in those days. And if you’re losing 10% of your money, and the interest rate is only like 4%, you’ve lost two and a half years of interest. And the principal value of all of this.
So what is the attraction of the United States as an investment market and of the dollar as an international reserve currency for foreign central banks and means for saving? All of Trump’s actions and its sort of nutty economics that really don’t work at all when you do the math and just project the statistical trends, you can see that the economy is in a real non-investable for foreign countries.
So this should act as a kind of catalyst to force them to say, if we don’t act together, we’re all going to hang separately, if we don’t hang together, as I think the American revolutionists put it.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Michael, Donald Trump is threatening to ban Chinese built ships, a large strategy of economic isolation and possible self sabotage. How is that in his mind? How is that going to benefit the United States?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, an awful lot of trade is in ships done in China. The tax rules and the regulatory rules for US ships are so high that there are hardly any US ships around.
And China and along with, I think, South Korea and Japan have developed shipbuilding and created their own market.
But if you ban Chinese ships from American markets, well, ships often go from one country to another. And that means that the whole set of countries that the ships go to somehow will be blocked from trade if he does that. So this is another. It’s a non-tariff barrier that in many ways is even more of a deal blocker.
By the way, Trump also is insisting in Panama that American ships do not have to pay any fees at all. And Panama had just said American ships have to pay larger fees because they’re so big that they require special attention. Trump has insisted they have to pay nothing, increasing shipping for all other countries.
So not only do you have tariff barriers, the whole cost of transportation and foreign trade has gone up.
Well, in the last few days, the United States has approached South Korea and Japan and said, let’s say we need to have a three country agreement in building ships. And we’ll call them U.S., You’ll build them, but we’ll put a U.S. flag on them so that we can essentially build them. And the question is whether South Korea and Japan will do this.
Well, I think in the last show we discussed Japan that already is thinking, do we really want to tie our future to the United States now that it’s blocked our exports? Do we want to think of reorienting with China?
So the question is if shipping to the United States in ships that are not U.S. ships or ships that are either Chinese or have traded with China, then that trade is simply stopped. Well, you can see that the trade is not really going to stop. It’ll just be redirected away from the United States.
So once again, Trump in trying to isolate China is ending up isolating himself.
And the reason he’s gone to South Korea and Japan is somebody told him, you know, it takes 10 years to just build a port that is capable of building a ship. They’re gigantic for ships. You have to set up a whole system. You have to create an enormous forward planning and expensive shipbuilding industry.
China, South Korea and Japan have already invested the sunk costs in all of these. But now these costs for the United States are enormous, especially because we’ve just deported a major source of American construction labor.
So you can just look at how every act that he’s done trying to isolate China has just isolated the United States and cut itself off from other countries. Throwing the decision onto other countries about, well, now that we have to trade with ourselves, what are the terms and conditions and institutions that we’re going to base our own trade with? Well, they’ll need a new international monetary fund, a new World Bank, and ultimately a new United Nations.
Well, speaking of the United Nations, another thing that Trump has cut back is health spending. Drastic cutbacks, there’s health and weather. They’ve cut back the weather forecasting here. Just when global warming has gone way up and extreme weather has increased, stuff threatening American cities. You have landslides here. You have flooding every night on the news. All the coping with bad weather, that’s cut back and is causing devastation.
And these areas on sea level is where you’d make the shipping. You’re not going to build shipping in the middle of Indiana. You have to build it on the ocean, and that’s exactly where you have the rising sea levels.
And regarding sea levels, Trump has also pulled the United States out of all of the environmental agreements for global warming.
And also, the Americans are getting very sick. They’ve cut back all of the reporting now on COVID and other diseases. There’s no more weekly or monthly reporting on the spread of COVID, the tests from the water supply of COVID.
So the Americans are getting sicker. The lifespan of Americans are going down while almost all other countries are going up.
Just to add to the problems that every action that Trump has taken worsens conditions, certainly for the 90% of the economy. And the 90% of the economy is basically responsible for the production in the economy. The 10% are rentiers. They live on their stocks and bonds and real estate rents.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Michael, before wrapping up this session, a very important question right now when it comes to the conflict in Ukraine to the Middle East. And whenever we’re talking about it, it’s the SWIFT system that the United States is using.
And when they put sanctions on other countries like Russia and Iran, they cannot use it. Here is the question, in my opinion. The main question right now for the United States and the Trump administration would be, is the attempt to monopolize information technology and platforms like SWIFT a sustainable strategy for maintaining the United States global influence?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Ever since Marco Polo visited China and some Catholic priests brought back silkworms to the West, it’s been almost impossible for any country to monopolize any technology.
The Italian fashion designers and Italian technologists were driven out of Italy by essentially the dictatorship and the inquisition. The French industrialists were driven out again by the Catholic inquisition there to other countries.
It’s not possible to prevent a technology from developing. And also because technology itself is evolving very rapidly and to evolve, you need research and development that in a financialized economy like the United States, you’re not going to back research and development because that takes development takes time. It takes a couple of years to develop something.
And if you’re a chief financial officer of a technology company, you’re paid by according to how much money you make on the stock of your company. So you use your profits for stock buybacks or to pay out dividends to increase the stock price, not for research and development.
Well, countries that are not financialized, like China, don’t have that problem. Countries that do not have a financial class that has taken over industry and financialized it to make money financially instead of industrially are obviously have an advantage in their developing new technology.
And that’s why almost weekly now we’re having reports of new Chinese breakthroughs and computers and others. In the last month, China’s announced this new kind of a block chain system for payments that are made in its currency and currency of friendly countries in order to break free of SWIFT.
So once you try to protect the technology, what you do is force other countries to not only duplicate it, but usually because it’s later now than it was when America developed it. Usually they’re able to improve it this time around and get an advantage.
And so every kind of sanction has helped other countries develop their own self-reliance in this technology, just as we’ve discussed in the case of Russia and numerous occasions on your show before. And that’s exactly what’s happening now.
China’s spending the money on development, other countries, South Korea, Japan, other countries are doing this.
The United States hoped somehow that it could have its investment banks buy control of these foreign countries industry or buy them out and consolidate them into the American parent companies. countries because a lot of this research and development is funded by governments there, just as it is here. The governments are not willing to let these industries that they funded be sold out to the American bankers and turned over to the United States to monopolize at the expense of their own domestic economies.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Thank you so much, Michael, for being with us today. Great pleasure as always.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, it’s really good to be here. I wonder. I hope other countries can solve the problems that we’ve discussed. I think we’ve shown what’s needed to solve them. I guess that’s for future shows.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Yeah, exactly.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Thank you.
NIMA ALKHORSHID: Thank you. Thank you very much.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Thank you.
‘So that’s basically what’s happening. Other countries are being asked to sacrifice themselves to the U.S. economy.’
Got that right. Trump was just saying that he is going to hit the EU with a tariff rate of 50%. But if they want to avoid it, they can move their factories to the US. Not the first time he has said that either. Of course any country that did that would suffer a lower GDP while at the same time there would be increased unemployment due to those now out of work factory workers. I suppose his idea is that the whole world will send their natural resource to the US on the cheap where the US will then process it and sell it back to the world at a much higher value. Apart from the obvious mistakes there is one fundamental one. As the US is a continental power, it’s lifeblood is maritime shipping and we are already witnessing the effects on a pause in that shipping. But does the US even have a merchant marine anymore? They hardly make the ships for all that trade and even its military depends on foreign ships to move their units these days. And yet Trump has been attacking maritime shipping to the US through sanctions, tariffs and extra-charges for Chinese-built ships which is, well, the majority of them.
You’d enjoy the interview that The Duran (Alex and Alex) did with Stanislav Krapivnik a few days ago, because he addresses the US’s lack of a merchant marine from direct experience as a former US military logistician. The interview is here – https://youtu.be/cSvfIB8O2TA?si=KDeyGewRTTRtDOjX – and the relevant portion starts at about 27:39. It’s a fascinating anecdote.
I saw that video yesterday which is why I mentioned the modern day lack of a US merchant marine. It certainly was a fascinating interview. It looks like sanctions are really killing global trade routes by causing so much chaos in the supply chain.
A couple of points about the US ‘usurpation’ of British imperium (which was really in train from at least 1916). Why did the US screw the UK in 1944-46, and not West Germany in the early 1950s? After all, West Germany posted very robust growth following the creation of the European Payments Union in 1950 (under US sponsorship), and was already well on its way to becoming, and by some distance, the pre-eminent industrial power in Europe. Yet in the London Debt Agreement, the wartime allies under great pressure from the US (which was creditor for about 80% of the German debt), agreed to a 50% haircut, with West Germany only being obliged to redeem its debts if it was running a current account surplus. The UK received no comparable treatment, and was obliged to expend considerable capital – despite having savings rates comparable to West Germany – on overseas defence (which relieved the burden on the US) and on defending the Bretton Woods sterling parity (which was increasingly viewed as the main defensive glacis of the gold/dollar parity).
This was, surely, partly because of the shadow of US ill-feeling about the British WW1 debt moratorium of 1934, which coincided with the implementation of imperial preference, but then Germany went rather further than the UK by repudiating its debts outright in 1933.
So why the different treatment? My guess is that the different treatment wasn’t only because West Germany was perceived by US policymakers as the motor of European reconstruction, but more especially because its main opposition party in 1953 was the SPD which was then an explicitly Marxist (though by no means a Leninist) party. The SPD was perceived as a real risk in Washington: after all, it had won the largest number of seats in 1949. And it only abandoned Marxism with the Godesberg programme in 1959.
Would the post-war settlement which the US imposed upon the UK have been different had the UK presented the ‘threat’ to US interests of a Marxist government or opposition? If Churchill had been opposed by the Stalinist Harry Pollitt instead of the devotedly Atlanticist Clem Attlee in 1953, would the US have been rather more indulgent towards the massive British wartime debt load? I rather think it would have been. It seems quite clear that the US defrayed the full cost of France’s abortive war in Indo-China during the late 1940s and early 1950s because of the relative strength of the PCF under Maurice Thorez, another Stalinist, and at a time when the financial condition of France was very parlous. It sometimes helps any supplicant country in its negotiations with the US to have a large section of its political class be ardently opposed to US interests.
How can the USAians (supplicants of Trumpianism) “negotiate” when what is left of the political left has nothing to counter Trumps dismantling of everything that was good in the country while keeping the most destructive pieces in place?
This post with transcript should be sent to every member of congress and all government employees. It is an excellent clear-headed explanation of the disaster Trump is visiting on the country.
Nope. It was mostly about Germany being the industrial power house, and thus being the one selected to rise European manufacturing to the level that there was stuff to sell to USA, to get dollars, so that Europeans could buy from USA and thus USA would avoid another depression without resorting to another “new deal”.
State Department meticulously evaluated the post-war industrial capacity of each European country in order to plan for this. It did not matter that USA had agreed to keep Germany united and only lightly industrialized in Yalta and Potsdam. The establishing of Western Germany from the Western Allies Occupation Zones surprised not just Soviet Union, but UK and France, too.
Polar Socialist It was mostly about Germany being the industrial power house, and thus being the one selected to rise European manufacturing to the level that there was stuff to sell to USA, to get dollars, so that Europeans could buy from USA and thus USA would avoid another depression without resorting to another “new deal”.
@ Polar Socialist –
Thank you. I was going to comment on this yesterday but didn’t have the time. US policy also did this very consciously with Japan.
The part of the overall Marshall Plan where this was articulated even had a name — The Global Plan, somewhat prosaically. Varoufakis has a chapter on this in his THE GLOBAL MINOTAUR that’s available online
https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/chapter-3-the-global-plan.pdf
Washington was run by New Dealers, very conscious of the Great Depression only just behind them and not at all believers in self-correcting markets ideology. Thus, Germany and Japan were built up in the post-WW2 world as alternative surplus-recycling entities in the event that another Great Depression eventuated on the US mainland.
Sorry, but Michael Hudson seems behind the times. I quote:”the most obvious thing you need in America to re-industrialize, you need labor. But there’s America doesn’t have the labor force to work in industry because nobody wants to work in industry, because the pay rates are so low for very hard factory work jobs, blue-collar labor, that it’s only 35 cents an hour more than being a waiter or a service industry person or a stacker in an Amazon warehouse.”
He doesn´t seem to understand that labor cost is all but a small factor in today’s manufacturing. Capital costs are the big thing. Every new generation of tool machines results in huge productivity gains. But you need the labor to run those machines. It doesn´t matter whether you pay them 10$ or 100$ an hour. What matters is whether they are conscientious and well trained.
I live in Southwest Germany and have some insight into two huge European companies. ABB and BASF. First ABB: it is a European electrical conglomerate which produces all over the world. The reason why the factories in China haven´t been able to edge out factories in Europe is solely because of this. There simply aren´t enough specialised workers. No matter what you pay them. If they can´t run a laser printing machine by Trumpf you can´t employ them. The factory making circuit breakers near Heidelberg – as much as it might annoy headquarters in Switzerland loath to pay upwards of 50€ an hour – is still the head factory for all of the world. You can´t replace them as they must remotely supervise the factory in Shanghai running on older machines from Heidelberg. Chinese workers of the highest qualification are paid the same as German workers but there aren´t any.
Same but much worse in the US. In 2017 ABB acquired the hopelessly outdated General Electric’s Industrial Solutions. GE didn´t invest for decades in new machinery but relied on having a captive market in the US. Basically they were supplying the spare parts for the US grid which was mostly GE to begin with. After Hurricane Sandy (remember the transformers that blew up in Manhattan?) and assorted other catastrophies the choice for the utility companies was whether to use outdated GE stuff or turn to ABB. GE was edged out of their home market and in the end ABB paid 2,7 Billion for the division including the brand name and now slaps GE on stuff made in Europe. No use bringing US factories up to scratch. The employees and the machinery both are to old.
BASF runs the largest Chemical plant in the world. It is near Ludwigshafen and the most efficient plant there is. Years ago I asked a retired executive from Dow Chemical whether BASF might ever go under. No way, he said as long as they run Ludwigshafen. Well, he didn´t reckon with the explosions in the Baltic Sea. Ever since BASF has to pay 4 times as much for gas than before and two years ago the decision was made to not invest there anymore but invest somewhere else.
The US tried to get BASF to relocate to the Gulf coast. Biden’s „inflation reducation act“ actively subdidizes European industry to come to the States. Theoretically a match made in heaven. Money and cheap gas. But BASF instead will build a replica of Ludwigshafen in China. The reason? No work force in the US. Huge health problems among kids in the US (40% per RFK a few days ago), miserable schooling and no vocational training. Chemical workers are the best paid workers in Germany and BASF would gladly pay just as much in the US. After all capital outlays are huge and the US provides reliable and cheap gas which is not as guaranteed in Shanghai. Still it will be China. Without the US solving her health and education problems no industrial company will invest there. The only exceptions are investments that are not subject to international competition.
And thank you for this. All very true and something else I wanted to say yesterday.
Though you don’t address the fact that, more generally beyond the chemicals industry, factories are being roboticized and in some cases becoming all-dark, while overall manufacturing employment is following the path of agricultural labor and going down to something like 2 percent or less of the workforce.
Thus: –
[1] while, yes, Hudson is 86 and doesn’t really get the extent to which manufacturing employment is going away (which is understandable) because it’s irrelevant.
[2] Simultaneously, he’s right about the overall picture, which is that the US almost certainly cannot bring manufacturing back to the US homeland because, while in some industries it could in principle theoretically build the necessary robot factories, the level of investment and technical planning required is something that current US elites are both incapable of and unwilling to do.
A quick search shows that roughly 30% of the workforce in China is in manufacturing. I wonder how long it will take to be reduced to 2%? Japan and Germany also have relatively high proportions in manufacturing.
And point 2 is the kicker: the high overhead costs that prof. Hudson often outlines is still a factor, no matter what level of automation. And as noted, no plans are in the works to improve the energy and electrical infrastructure (as well as other capital-intensive investment), that would require massive capital outlays.
There will still need to be (although smaller) a group of highly skilled workers to run all the high-tech systems. Without brain draining other countries and H1B workers, who will train the domestic US workers?
Prof. Hudson’s overall point is valid, percentages notwithstanding.
If humans are increasingly being made redundant in manufacturing, there will simply not be enough “jobs”, servants and service jobs for the oligarchy will also be displaced by automation/robotics/AI.
The “surplus population” will have to be dealt with one way or another. Maybe a good-old-fashioned world war and more pandemics would do the trick.
It was not clear that West Germany was the pre-eminent industrial power in Europe until about 1952-53, and it was also unclear that it was on a trajectory to become so until about 1951-52. Prior to then Britain had a significant lead in production, and very big lead even prior to the formation of the EPU in 1950. The retooling of British industry in the second half of the 1940s was aided in large measure by systematic British looting of German factories within its zone of occupation (which included many the most significant industrial regions).
Indeed, the existence of this lead was one of the reasons why the US was keen that the UK take the lead on pushing for European integration. Acheson gave up on this once it became clear that Attlee would not accept suprantional control and rationalisation of the British coal and steel sectors (coal having lately been nationalised after a generational struggle on the part of the Labour movement, and the Commonwealth still being significantly more important to the UK economy than Europe).
The failure of Britain’s economic lead was due in large measure to the switch from civilian to military production at the commencement of the Korean war. This led to a failure of investment in civilian productive capacity and effectively ceded the European market to West Germany. Attlee was insistent on re-armament in order to prove British bona fides and because of the same belief in ‘doing the right thing’ which had informed Edward Grey in 1914. This was compounded by the costs of holding down Kenya and Malaya, but more especially by the view that the UK should revive the empire model of development, in which it would export capital to its colonies in exchange for raw materials (by screwing down domestic living standards), with the presumption that improved living standards in the colonies would, at long last, permit them to function as vents for British exports. This vision collided with the ambitions of both the dominions and nationalists within the colonies for import substitution.
In terms of the formation of West Germany it was of little surprise to Whitehall. Indeed, the UK had made it very clear to the US in 1946-47 that it could not afford the cost of the British zone, and that its zone would have to be merged with that of the US to form the ‘bi-zone’. The UK was comfortable about this because it assumed that the SPD would win the 1949 elections (in whose favour it intervened behind the scenes), and its only shock was when it didn’t. The urge to press the British sector upon the US was driven in large measure by the ‘financial Dunkirk’ of 1947, which occurred because the dollar loan of 1946 necessitated convertibility, which turned into a rout (it was that disaster which also precipitated the scuttle in India and the withdrawal from Greece and, to some extent, from Palestine). However, you are right that France was profoundly shocked by the formation of the bi-zone. Prior to 1947 French policy was based upon the UK continuing to act as the primary guarantor of French security against Germany. Britain’s decision to form the bi-zone was seen by France as a betrayal of that guarantee and under Alphand (the leading official at the Quai) it led to a complete re-formulation of French policy, under which French security would be secured by means of economic inter-dependence (i.e., by the Schuman Plan) rather than confrontation or the Balkanisation of Germany.
I agree that the State Department planned things meticulously (and saw off challenges from other departments in the process, who were far more sceptical about European integration), but its planning was dynamic rather than static. Until 1949-50 the UK was perceived as the pre-eminent industrial and political power in Europe; in 1950-51 the position had become fluid, but by 1951-52 the contours of a new paradigm – with West Germany in the lead – had become evident. However, as mentioned, the German lead was a direct consequence of US policy: (i) of a determination to have the UK redeem its debts in full in order to prevent a repetition of 1934 and to use as a lever to break imperial preference; (ii) of the UK acting as the chief auxiliary in Korea and elsewhere, which prevented the US from incurring additional costs, even if this was to the significant detriment of British manufacturing and export markets; and (iii) of the realisation that Europe could not function as an effective vent without Franco-German reconciliation which, perforce, rendered Britain marginal.
The bonfire of British vanities in the early years after the war – from a position of great confidence (a confidence shared by Washington, which is why it felt it could drive the UK a hard bargain) – has been covered very well in this new addition to the already large body of literature on this period: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/superpower-britain-9780192863706?cc=mx&lang=3n#
An unexpected burst of delight echoed through our house as Michael Hudson spoke of the president of screw manufacturing shut down her no longer profitable company and the macroeconomic landscape we were treated to became a replay of one of the best- ever stories by tall tale teller Bil Lepp: The King of Little Things.
King Normous declared war on the King of screws, staples and ants, and Normous suffered an ignominious defeat as even his pants fell down (a line for the youngest in the audience).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxDoyXPE9JE&ab_channel=CCPL
The King of Little Things is from 37:45 to 50:20, the end of the session.
Somebody please pass this along to Michael Hudson!
As we weigh morality tales like Bil Lepp’s story, and the historic dynamics in Michael Hudson’s account, some echo is found in Russia’s having partly exercised the sovereign’s option, with international business weighing the costs after their assets in Russia experienced losses.
what a wonderful telling. and a message old as time that regularly fails to land.
“And if you grab our assets, we get to grab all of your foreign investments in our countries.” Not so fast there, pardner! The US has military bases in half the world’s countries. There are clearly some impediments to the locals grabbing US assets.
the key word in your response may be “some”. some impediments. the US military stick is looking a bit brittle of late, and i expect some consider this stick might be readily broken if an attempt is made to actually use it. military force works best as a hovering threat, it seems. if it gets tested, we may see it for what it really is.
Yeah, like in Yemen with Ansar Allah. When a rag-tag bunch can chase off imperial forces, even after being repeatedly bombed, it sends a clear message to the rest of the world, or should do.
Always a pleasure to listen to prof. Hudson.
The US does not have the skilled labor force, and has no plans to create the education and training facilities to create one. But some say AI will render skilled labor obsolete. It’s like magic, AI will do everything and human beings will be made redundant. (except as a source of Soylent Green)
Also, the US has the most expensive health care extortion in the world and the only “developed” country to not have a health care system. For many years, the US has had the lowest, or close to it, health care outcomes in the OECD.
The average life expectancy and general health indicators among many lower and middle income groups is on the decline, and I would attribute this to multiple factors. A lack of quality, affordable health care, even if one has so-called insurance. The very high psycho-social stress among a majority of the US population creates massive mental health problems as well. A misinformed, poorly-trained,, sick society with very high levels of mental health problems does not contribute to global competitiveness.
Also, the larger picture: the levels of institutional rot and corruption only increase. The quality of our “leaders” (in both the so-called public and private sectors) just gets worse over time. Just when we think we have reached “peak kakistocracy” with senile Genocide Joe, we now have a cognitively challenged Orange Idiot. I have heard profs. Hudson, Wolff call him a “moron”, if the shoe fits…
To be fair, it is very likely that DT is experiencing cognitive decline, as well as displaying clear signs of egomania, malignant narcissism and memory loss. He doesn’t seem to remember his own BS
But we are not supposed to notice the emperor has no marbles, everything will be fine, no worries, as long as “the market” keeps bubbling.
Could someone here explain what Michael Hudson is saying? Is there a simpler way of understanding? Thank you, and thank you Yves for providing this link.
“Well, what the United States then did was go to continental Europe and say, well, look, we’ve done this with England. That’s the prototype. There was an inertia and England was always the first to sell out Europe and other countries to surrender to the United States. And the US would take its surrender and use that negotiation to set the rules that other countries were supposed to join.
Well, that’s just what happened in the last few days. The United States went to England and made it, it agreed, without mentioning China specifically, it agreed on trade rules that were national security rules, meaning anything that China exported to England that could be national security, like cloth that could be used for army uniforms, anything that would be banned.”.
Starmer just signed a “trade deal” limiting the rise in US tariffs on the UK in return for some token market opening (US beef?) and granting the US a veto over Chinese economic links (the trade deal gets pulled if the US doesn’t approve of a Chinese FDI in UK).
Trump will use this as the model with the EU.
The UK as ever is pursuing ne plus ultra Atlanticism. In fairness, they have done the best deal short of a Russian-style “no deal” because Trump needed the precedent this gives and a quick win domestically and the UK is smaller than the EU and has balanced trade with the US so any US concessions are cheaper.
Huh? They are not remotely comparable.
The US already has a surplus with the UK. It runs a big trade deficit with the EU, over $250 billion.
Quite a few commentators speculate that Trump made this threat when he did because Greenland signed a rare earths deal with an EU mining group.
One week ago, Politico, in Greenland dangles rare earths partnership with EU as Trump looms:
https://www.politico.eu/article/greenland-dangles-rare-earths-partnership-eu-motzfeldt-trump/
Reuters, three days ago, in Greenland gives Danish-French group permit to mine rock with green potential, in wake of Trump interest:
https://archive.is/xRx93#selection-1203.31-1231.0
Many outlets depicted this agreement as a “blow” to Trump. For instance, from Newsweek:
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-greenland-minerals-2076693
Reventant: The UK … has balanced trade with the US so any US concessions are cheaper
Not exactly.
In 2023, the UK’s services exports to the US were £126.3 billion, or $167.78 billio, making it the UK’s largest export partner for services, and putting UK’s services trade surplus with the US at £68.9 billion, or $91.53 billion.
That services exports surplus with the US has gone up — substantially — since 2023, but I couldn’t lay my hands on reliable figures for 2024. Obviously, nevertheless, an agreement with the US on UK good exports that distracts Trump’s little brain from that UK services exports surplus is a Good Thing.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/681343167e56aaab3b5253e5/united-states-trade-and-investment-factsheet-2025-05-02.pdf
Interestingly, in 2023 the UK earned £470 billion from services exports, or $628 billion. In the 12 months preceding February 2025, total UK exports of both goods and services was £1,790.5 billion, making the UK the world’s fourth largest exporter.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1312780/trade-in-services-exports-uk-by-service/
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-trade-in-numbers/uk-trade-in-numbers-web-version
As for Hudson’s point that the US will try to use UK agreement with US as a battering ram to get the EU, this is so obvious as to almost not be worth stating. In this connection, too, it’s worth recalling that Britain has had the same foreign policy goal for at least the last 500 years.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIiVqiK-Ewg
The pursuit of that goal, for instance, is why the likes of Sir Richard Dearlove, former SIS (MI6) chief, and his former associates like Christopher Steele, former head of that agency’s Moscow division, produced the Steele Dossier in an attempt to assure the accession of Hillary Clinton to the White House, so the Ukraine conflict could kick off shortly after that. It’s also one big reason why the whole UK establishment has been so big on promoting that conflict in general.
If Great Britain had not conspired with Woodrow Wilson to maneuver an unwilling America into joining World War I to begin with, would any of the rest of this stuff have ever happened?
The USA never goes to war unless it is in it’s economic interests. The US was exporting large quantities of good to the Allies, and wanted to keep that game going.
Still true 110 years later, thanks.
Changing one decision does not change the nature of the beast. USA is unwilling to join a war, until the outcome is certain. Then it sends the cavalry to mop up and claim the spoils of war. Then it makes movies about winning the war by itself.
P.S. Modern day USA is a bit different. It initiates a war, sends the cavalry to some weak country, then fights without intention of winning, then the cavalry bravely runs away. Then it makes movies about their soldiers being sad because of the whole thing.